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©Nir Eisikovits 
Chapter 3: A Theory of Truces 
Chapter one established that our leading theory of peace is Kantian and that our 
political discourse about war’s end is heavily influenced by that theory. Kant’s insistence 
that war must be abolished as a social phenomenon, that peace agreements should be 
comprehensive and resolve all outstanding differences, his confidence that war will, 
eventually, recede as the realm of democracy expands, his faith in the possibility of 
lawful international cooperation and the pacific influence of commerce, have, to a large 
degree, come to define our contemporary understanding of peace.  Whenever policy 
makers reject interim agreements between belligerents as “mere truces,” when they urge 
rivals to focus on “conflict resolution” rather than “conflict management,” they take their 
bearings from a tradition of thinking inaugurated by Kant. We have also surveyed, in 
chapter 2, some of the most important criticisms of Kant’s cosmopolitan view of peace –
from skeptics who questioned the very possibility of moral standards in international 
relations to those, like Fichte and, much later, Habermas, who argued that Kant’s theory 
of peace made too many concessions to the realities of the political world. We concluded 
that while Kant’s account, generously interpreted, can deflect many of these criticisms, 
four of them raised serious concerns. 
This chapter begins by recapping the most serious challenges facing Kant’s idea 
of peace. It proceeds to argue that these challenges suggest the need for a theory of truces 
and ceasefires. Most of the chapter is dedicated to articulating that theory. It provides a 
taxonomy of truces and ceasefires, characterizes the philosophical and political 
commitments involved in truce making, explains why the idea of truce is not susceptible 
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to the main criticisms of Kant’s theory of peace, defends the idea of truces from Kant’s 
charge of realpolitik, articulates positive arguments for adding the idea of truces to our 
philosophical and political repertoire and considers the normative conditions under which 
it is most appropriate to make truces.   
 
1. Challenges for Kant’s theory of peace 
Cosmopolitan peace and asymmetrical warfare 
Many conflicts since the end of World War II have been of the asymmetrical 
variety: they involve a well-trained conventional army on the one hand, and an 
organization (or set of organizations), using guerilla tactics on the other.1 Since guerillas 
are notoriously difficult to defeat, and since any achievement in fighting them turns on 
gaining and then keeping the support of the population within which guerillas find refuge, 
these conflicts are often managed rather than decisively won.  
Consider the following quote from David Galula’s classic Counterinsurgency 
Warfare: Theory and Practice: “A victory [in counterinsurgency warfare] is not the 
destruction in a given area of the insurgent’s forces and his political organization. If one 
is destroyed, it will be locally re-created by the other; if both are destroyed, they will both 
be recreated by a new infusion of insurgents from the outside… A victory is that plus the 
permanent isolation of the insurgent from the population, isolation not enforced on the 
population but maintained by and with the population…”2 Asymmetrical warfare, Galula 
argues, fuses traditional fighting and social welfare efforts; it is the kind of conflict in                                                         
1 The military historian Martin Van Creveld argues that asymmetrical struggles accounts for approximately 
three quarters of warfare since World War II. See Van Creveld, M. 1991. The Transformation of War. New 
York, NY: Free Press. P. 20. And, on the rise of asymmetrical war more generally, Van Creveld, M.2007. 
The Changing Face of War: Lessons of Combat from Marne to Iraq. New York, NY: Presidio Press 
2 Galula, D. 1964. Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice. Wesport, CT: Praeger. p. 54  
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which infantry captains double as educators, repairmen and providers of social services. 
“The Soldier must…become a social worker, civil engineer, a school-teacher, a nurse, a 
boy scout.”3  
When this is the face of war, the cosmopolitan ideal of perpetual peace becomes 
problematic. Its emphasis on the final, comprehensive settling of all disputes appears 
mismatched for conflicts that, by their very nature, are difficult to end. Moreover, 
applying the cosmopolitan ideal to such conflicts may serve to prolong them. 
Asymmetrical warfare often takes place in states that lack effective political institutions. 
But since it is only a robust state with stable institutions that can enforce a Kantian peace, 
the cosmopolitan ideal may end up recommending a long, expensive and locally 
unpopular program of nation building.  
Take the recent NATO mission in Afghanistan as an example. As of this writing, 
a reduction of violence in that country may be militarily feasible once its government and 
army control some of the major cities. But for Kant war does not end when violence is 
reduced; it ends when violence is extinguished. Now extinguishing violence in 
Afghanistan, if it is possible at all, would require setting up an effective government 
bureaucracy, a professional army and police force which, between them, would have a 
monopoly over the use of force, a system of courts that would efficiently administer the 
law etc. An effort to create these institutions would likely meet with significant pushback 
from the locals, which would, in turn, require prolonging and expanding NATO presence 
indefinitely. The English scholar (recently turned member of Parliament) Rory Stewart 
provides a useful depiction of this conundrum. Reflecting on his years of involvement in                                                         
3 Ibid, 62. For a compelling account of how these dynamics played out in the recent war in Iraq see Finkel, 
D. 2009. The Good Soldiers. New York, NY: Farrar, Straus and Giroux. 
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Afghanistan, Stuart argues that international aid and development efforts there have been 
geared towards broadly cosmopolitan goals: instituting the rule of law, providing the 
bases for good governance, creating a legitimate monopoly over the use of violence. 
Ironically, the insistence on achieving these metrics served to distance aid providers from 
the actual needs of Afghans on the ground, required consistently increasing troop levels 
and, very often, alienated the indigenous population. “Lofty abstractions such as 
‘ungoverned space’, ‘the rule of law’ and ‘the legitimate monopoly on the use of violence’ 
are so difficult to apply to an Afghan village, that it was almost impossible to know when 
they were failing; and since it had, perhaps not yet succeeded, what after all would 
success look like, the international community sent in more money, and more troops...”4 
Stewart concludes that most plans for nation building in Afghanistan were “too inherently 
optimistic…too isolated from the concerns and realities of Afghan life, too caught up in 
metaphysical abstractions of governance and the rule of law ever to succeed or to notice 
that we were not succeeding.”5  
 
Cosmopolitan peace and missed opportunities 
Kant’s dismissal of truces and ceasefires as machinations “befitting the casuistry 
of a Jesuit” may cause us to miss chances for economizing on the costs of war. Here the 
point is not so much that the cosmopolitan ideal is ill-suited for thinking about 
asymmetrical conflict. It is, rather, that some wars are very difficult to end (even if they 
are of the symmetrical variety). In such cases insisting on the cosmopolitan view of peace 
can make us overlook valuable opportunities for partial or limited accommodations.                                                          
4 Stewart, R. and Knaus, G. 2011. Can Intervention Work?  New York, NY: Norton. P 220.  
5 Ibid, p. 303 
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Thus, for example, it may be impossible for the Indians and Pakistanis to reach a 
Kantian peace in the near future. And yet they managed to conclude the Indus Waters 
Treaty in 1960, which regulated water-sharing and fishing rights. That treaty has been 
upheld since, in spite of repeated military conflagrations between the two countries. 
Similarly, it was impossible for the Spanish Republicans and Fascists to reach a Kantian 
peace after Franco’s death. The conditions were simply too tense for a mutual reckoning 
about past atrocities – a reckoning required by a truly Kantian view of peace. And so both 
sides agreed on a “pacto de olvido,” a pact of forgetting that kept Spain quiet, but also 
kept the parties from doing justice for past abuses, for more than three decades. This 
agreement, certainly a “mere truce” in Kantian terms, allowed the Spaniards to refrain 
from killing each other until conditions ripened for a more honest examination of the 
past.6 To offer one more example, it may be impossible for the Israelis and the Hamas to 
agree on the outlines of a final peace settlement. The two groups are far apart on the core 
questions required for a comprehensive accord –mutual recognition, final borders, the 
status of Palestinian refugees and so on. And yet, they may be able (and have come close 
in the past) to agree on a long-term ceasefire or “hudna”. Such an agreement may prepare 
the ground for a more principled relationship in the future. Or it may, at least, provide the 
parties with several years of quiet. The Kantian ideal would have rejected such a partial 
accommodation. We shall have much more to say about these last two examples in the 
third part of the book.  
                                                        
6 In October 2007 the Spanish Parliament passed the “Historical Memory Law” which, among other things, 
declared many of the sentences handed down by Franco’s courts as illegitimate, directed the exhumation of 
mass graves in which opponents of the facist regime were buried and ordered the removal of some of the 
memorials glorifying the dictatorship. For a useful review of the political significance of that law see: 
Blakeley, G.2008. “Politics as usual? The Trials and Tribulations of the Law of Historical 
Memory in Spain” Entelequia. Revista Interdisciplinar, 7 pp. 315–330.  
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Cosmopolitan peace and democratic crusading 
Kant’s claim, in Definitive Article 1 of Perpetual Peace, that democratic 
governance promotes peace, may lead to the coercive spread of democracy. The 
cosmopolitan ideal may, in spite of Kant’s intentions to the contrary, end up sanctioning 
the imposition of liberal values in the name of the peace and prosperity they promise to 
usher in. While Kant may think that democracy develops organically – each state at its 
own pace - his theory generates the risk of a democratic “crusade” for peace.  This is the 
crux of Kenneth Waltz’s well-known claim that the cosmopolitan peace might engender  
“a perpetual war for perpetual peace.” As the Kant scholar Luigi Caranti explains, in a 
given conflict between democrats and non-democrats, “Kant’s first article seems to 
provide both a criterion for deciding a priori who is right and who is wrong (because 
democracies are naturally peaceful, then they were certainly forced to embark in this 
enterprise) as well as a justification ex post facto (that is, from the point of view of 
universal history) for democratic violence against non democracies: even if democratic 
violence was not legitimate, at least it served the goal of advancing the final goal of 
history, that is, the transformation of all states into republics, which in turn would bring 
about peace.”7  
The worry here is that by tying security to a certain form of political organization, 
namely democracy, the Kantian ideal may provide the grounds for an expansive view of 
preventive war – a spreading of democracy by force in order to make the world safer.8 
                                                        
7 Caranti, L. 2006. “Perpetual War for Perpetual Peace? Reflections on the Realist Critique of Kant's 
Project.” Journal of Human Rights 5, p. 344 
8 The political scientist Tony Smith argues that this commitment to the relationship between democratic 
governance and international security has done much to shape American foreign policy: “The most 
consistent tradition in American foreign policy . . . has been the belief that the nation’s security is best 
protected by the expansion of democracy worldwide.” Smith, T.1993. America’s Mission: The United 
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Kant and the “peace paradox” 
Fourth, and most broadly, the cosmopolitan ideal’s wholesale rejection of war – 
the insistence that war must be abolished as a social phenomenon may, paradoxically, 
end up generating unnecessarily brutal wars. By setting up the annihilation of war and the 
creation of a lawful world order governed by “right” or just law as political aims, 
cosmopolitans end up committing themselves to fighting the “last war.” Such conflicts 
have an extraordinary purchase on people’s motivations and may, as a result, end up 
being especially deadly. In other words, the Kantian tendency to posit lasting and stable 
peace as the only acceptable way of ending a war can make wars longer and more brutal 
than they have to be. What President Wilson and others called “the war to end all wars” 
has a good claim on intensity, given the promised benefit.  
In a recent book about the Napoleonic Wars, American historian David Bell 
labeled this dynamic the “Peace Paradox.” He reminds us that we have inherited from the 
Enlightenment, and specifically from Kant, the idea that peace is our birthright, that war 
and violence are irrational aberrations to be uprooted. But such an uprooting, by the very 
fact that it is seen as the eradication of an abnormality, precisely because it promises to 
return us to our original state of peace, gains a substantial claim on violence. Bell writes: 
“A vision of war as utterly exceptional – as a final cleansing paroxysm of violence – did 
not simply precede the total war of 1792-1815. It helped, decisively, to bring it about. 
Leaders convinced that they were fighting “the last war” could not resist committing ever 
greater resources to it, attempting to harness all their societies’ energies to a single 
                                                                                                                                                                     
States and the Worldwide Struggle for Democracy in the Twentieth Century. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton 
University Press. p. 9. 
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purpose, and ultimately sacrificing lives on an industrial scale so as to defeat supposedly 
demonic enemies.”9  
 
2. The need for a theory of truce and what it should do 
  In the opening paragraphs of Perpetual Peace Kant dismisses accommodations 
meant to limit rather than comprehensively extinguish war. Perpetuity, he reminds us, 
inheres in the very concept of peace. A truce or ceasefire is “an artifice worthy of the 
casuistry of a Jesuit” - done in bad faith for the promotion of short-term interests. Such 
partial agreements benefit only the political elites who broker them. Kant witnessed a 
great deal of cynical truce making between the great European powers - agreements that 
transferred ownership and sovereignty as if lands and their inhabitants were so many bags 
of flour. Naturally, these transactions shaped his uncharitable view of non-cosmopolitan 
arrangements.10 But Kant is too harsh with truce makers. He assumes a dichotomy 
between a cosmopolitan peace and the most extreme form of political realism. Either we 
aim for a comprehensive, principled settlement that promises to resolve all outstanding 
questions and brings the fighting parties under a relationship governed by just law, or we 
acquiesce in a view of politics championed by Thrasymachus and Machiavelli. 
Contemporary Kantians state the case less starkly, but their thrust is similar. As 
philosopher Pauline Kleingeld puts it at the end of an important essay on Kant’s theory of 
peace: “for those who do not just want to say that in the international arena might makes 
right, Kant’s theory of peace represents a classical theoretical framework for developing                                                         
9 Bell, D. 2007. The First Total War: Napoleon’s Europe and the Birth of Warfare as we Know It. Boston, 
MA: Houghton Mifflin. p. 316.  
10 Recall that Perpetual Peace was written in response to the 1795 treaty of Basel between Prussia and 
France which ceded Prussian territory to France in return for French acquiescence to Prussian territorial 
machinations in Poland. See chapter 1, part 2.  
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a set of normative ideals concerning international relations and the human rights of 
individuals.”11  
The difficulties with the Kantian conception of peace outlined above suggest the 
need for a more tentative, modest way of theorizing war’s end; they indicate that it is 
worth paying attention to some of the middle ground left out of Kant’s dichotomy.  In a 
word, they prompt us to engage in the “casuistry of a Jesuit” and to offer a philosophical 
account of truces: a non-cosmopolitan theory concerned with the reduction and limitation 
(rather than the elimination) of war.  Influenced by Kant, our political imagination is 
committed to a binary distinction between war and peace. Since truces are neither, we 
don't pay them serious attention. As the brief but representative excerpts in the first 
chapter suggest, when we do think about truces we consider them as “mere truces”: 
stepping stones in the transition beyond themselves, to something better and more 
durable - a permanent peace. Truces are acceptable for a while, but then they must be left 
behind. Staying in one for too long signifies failure. When we do find ourselves in a long-
term truce we tend to obscure that reality by employing the terminology of war and peace 
all the same. The US and the Soviet Union had a “Cold War” for more than forty years 
although they never fought directly. The Americans and the Russians were not at war. 
And they were not at peace. Why don’t we have a clear way of thinking and talking about 
that in-between state? 
It is time to take truces much more seriously. By dismissing them and continuing 
to focus on the war-peace dichotomy we are denying ourselves a useful descriptive tool 
that could help us make sense of the way many conflicts actually subside. More                                                         
11  Kleingeld, P. 2006. “Kant’s Theory of Peace” in Guyer, P., ed. The Cambridge Companion to Kant and 
Modern Philosophy. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press. P. 501 
 10 
significantly, by insisting that the only acceptable way to end a war is with a lasting, 
stable peace, we risk fighting longer and harder than we have to, and missing 
opportunities to economize on the costs of war. 
A useful theory of truce would begin by providing a taxonomy of arrangements 
mitigating war that fall short of cosmopolitan peace. The theory would then describe the 
philosophical and practical commitments involved in the willingness to engage in truce- 
making. We shall call these commitments “Truce Thinking.” The theory would have to 
be resistant to the criticisms, articulated earlier, of Kant’s idea of peace. But such 
immunity would not be enough to recommend it. A theory of truce would have to be 
supported by positive arguments that establish why the idea of truce is specifically useful. 
Such a theory would also have to be resistant to Kant’s critique that truce making 
amounts to realpolitik. Finally, the theory would have to be normative as well as 
descriptive. Normatively, it would spell out at least some of the conditions under which it 
is especially appropriate to engage in truces. Descriptively, it would help to make sense 
of real cases where Truce Thinking was preferred to cosmopolitan arrangements. More 
controversially, it would be helpful in making counter factual historical judgments about 
cases where cosmopolitan thinking was employed erroneously and Truce Thinking could 
have been more helpful. In the remainder of this chapter I take up all but the last of these 
tasks. I will say a few words about the descriptive virtues of the theory here. But a 
detailed defense of its descriptive force will be provided in part III of the book.  
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3. A taxonomy of truces  
We will use the term “truce” to cover a variety of arrangements that halt war, 
prevent it from erupting, or reduce its scope - all without bringing about lasting peace. 
These arrangements fall under the headings of armistices, ceasefires, agreements to 
limit (rather than stop) belligerence and avoidance. Let us clarify these in turn.  
In the last century, the term armistice has come to signify a treaty ending 
hostilities. Famous armistices include the series of agreements signed in 1949 between 
Israel and its enemies in the 1948 Middle East war (Egypt, Lebanon, Jordan and Syria), 
and the 1953 Panmunjom Agreement that concluded the Korean War. Of these armistices, 
only two matured into full-blown peace agreements (between Israel and Egypt in 1979 
and between Israel and Jordan in 1994). Armistices preclude parties from exercising 
violence against each other, but they do not, as a rule, create the foundation for a lasting 
peace. As international law scholar Yoram Dinstein puts it “an armistice is restricted to 
the demise of the negative aspect of war.”12 While armistices can set geographic lines of 
demarcation between combatants, these newly drawn borders are viewed as temporary 
and usually remain closed. Unlike a formal peace agreement, an armistice almost never 
contains clauses regulating trade or cultural relations, and it does not provide for the 
creation of diplomatic ties.13  
Ceasefires involve the temporary cessation of hostilities between two parties and 
they can be initiated by local commanders on the ground or by political actors. They are 
often called for a specific duration and for specific purposes. The famous 1914                                                         
12 Dinstein, Y. 2001. War Aggression and Self Defense. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press. P.  
43 
13 See Dinstein, Ibid., and Greenwood C. 1995. “Scope of Application of Humanitarian Law” in Fleck, D. 
Handbook of Humanitarian Law in Armed Conflict. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.  
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“Christmas Truce” along the Western front was a locally initiated ceasefire for a limited 
time and for a specific purpose (it lasted up to four days and was meant to allow soldiers 
to rest during the holiday and to collect the dead that lay frozen in No Man’s Land).14 
Bosnians Serb and Muslim military commanders regularly agreed on short-term 
ceasefires during the Bosnian Civil War in order to collect their casualties.15 Ceasefires 
are sometimes called unilaterally. Thus, for example, the 2003 “Hudna” declared by 
Hamas was a unilateral ceasefire that quelled fighting between the organization and Israel 
and was meant to allow some respite for the beleaguered citizens of Gaza, as well as a 
chance for the Palestinian organization to regroup after the damage Israel inflicted on it.  
Agreements to limit (rather than stop) belligerence can restrict fighting to 
predetermined periods, or predetermined circumstances. The 11th century Christian 
doctrine of the “Truce of God” restricted fighting to four days of every week. During the 
1990’s Israel, Syria and Lebanon reached an informal set of agreements that limited 
fighting between Israel and Hezbollah to military targets in South Lebanon16. 
Finally, efforts of Avoidance are meant to get around belligerence altogether, 
even when the conditions for a long-term, principled and friendly relationship are lacking. 
This may be achieved by crafting coalitions that limit the powers of the different parties, 
by agreements (formal or informal) to divide zones of political influence, or through 
mutual deterrence (or by combinations of these methods). The so called “Concert of                                                         
14 For good accounts of the Christmas Truce see Weintraub, S. 2001. Silent Night. New York, NY: Free 
Press and Brown, M. and Seaton, S. 1999. Christmas Truce: The Western Front December 1914. London, 
U.K.: Pan Books. 
15 An especially affecting account of one such truce can be found in Loyd, A. 1999. My War Gone By I 
Miss it So. New York, NY: Penguin. PP. 112-115  
16 A good discussion of the doctrine of the Truce of God can be found in Cowdrey, H. E. J. 1970. “ The 
Peace and the Truce of God in the Eleventh Century.” Past and Present. pp. 42-67.  For a useful overview 
of the evolving relationship between Israel and Hezbollah see: Sobelman, D. 2003. New Rules: Israel and 
Hezbollah after the Retreat from Lebanon. Tel Aviv: Yafe Center for Strategic Studies (Hebrew).   
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Europe” created after the Napoleonic Wars contained France, restored the balance of 
powers in the continent, and kept it quiet for almost a century. The division of Europe 
into zones of influence after the Second World War, the Arms Race that ensued, and the 
threat of mutually assured destruction it generated were together responsible for the 
Americans and Soviets never fighting directly.  
 
4. Truce Thinking 
Belligerents sometimes make truces to enhance their ability to win wars. It is this 
truism that informs Kant’s cynical view of truces. But Kant’s position is oversimplified. 
There can be other motivations for making truces and, as we shall see, not all of them are 
ominous. What follows is a characterization of “Truce Thinking” - the philosophical 
assumptions and commitments that underpin the willingness to engage in truce making. 
 
A focus on immediate benefits  
The Jewish Satirist Alter Druyanov recounts an anecdote about a despot who 
decides his dog must learn to speak. The despot reviles the Jewish community living 
under him but admires their Rabbi for his wisdom and erudition. One evening the tyrant 
summons the rabbi. “You are one of the smartest people around,” the tyrant begins. “I 
don’t like you or your people, but I need help,” he continues. “See this dog at my feet– I 
need you to teach him to talk. If you succeed I will be kind to your people. If you fail - 
God help you all.”  The Rabbi strokes his beard for a long moment. “Teach your dog to 
talk… not easy…it will take a long time and a lot of money…give me five years and 
three thousand Dinars and I will do it.” The tyrant agrees, but not before he repeats his 
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threat. The Rabbi goes home and knocks on the door with excitement. “Bluma,” he tells 
his wife, “look! I have three thousand Dinars!” “That’s wonderful!” She exclaims. “How 
did this happen?” The Rabbi tells her. Bluma’s face turns grey. “What have you done? 
You can’t teach a dog to speak! We are done for.”  “Slow down, Bluma” The Rabbi 
replies. “Five years is a long time. Maybe the dog will die, maybe the tyrant will die, or 
maybe the Messiah will come. We’ll see”. 
Truce Thinking emphasizes immediate benefits - temporary relief, rest, quiet over 
more abstract considerations regarding the rights of the parties, mutual acknowledgment 
and settling questions about distributive justice. More precisely, Truce Thinking suggests 
that it is worthwhile pursuing immediate benefits even when we have no idea if the more 
permanent concerns can be addressed. Like the Rabbi, the Truce Thinker wants to buy 
time. During that time circumstances may change. The dog or the tyrant could die, or the 
Messiah might come: new, more moderate political parties could come to power, the 
balance between the global political parties supporting each of the combatants could shift, 
a manmade or natural cataclysm could put local tensions into perspective. Or the very 
fact of quiet and rest could generate stakes in continued quiet and rest. People could get 
used to not killing each other and hesitate to return to it.  
Peace Thinking is future oriented. The references to “the future of our children” 
pervade most peace speeches. “We want our children and your children to never again 
experience war”;17 “for the generations to come, for a smile on the face of every child 
born in our land, for all that I have taken my decision to come to you…to deliver my 
                                                        
17 Benjamin Netanyahu, speech at Bar Ilan University, June 14th, 2009.  
English version available online: http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/1092810.html 
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address”;18 “I do not believe that you want Northern Ireland to ever again be a place 
where tomorrow's dreams are clouded by yesterday's nightmares”.19 Truce Thinking, by 
contrast, is oriented towards the present. It deemphasizes the future. It leaves some of the 
hard work for the next generations. If the Israelis and the Palestinians can stop shooting at 
each other for ten years without resolving questions about borders, the status of Jerusalem, 
or the “right of return,” so be it. A lot could happen in ten years. If the Sunnis and Shiites 
can recreate a vibrant commercial life in Iraq without completely resolving the 
constitutional arrangement dividing power between them, so be it. Commercial life and 
the fact of quiet have their own dynamic. If the Afghan government can negotiate a five-
year ceasefire with Taliban and other insurgents that would allow for trade to resume in 
most of the country’s urban areas, such a ceasefire would be worth pursuing even if it did 
not settle all disagreements about power-sharing and the disarming of militias. Five years 
of quiet is a long time. Some of the disputes may resolve themselves. The local 
population whose support is necessary for any guerilla force to thrive may become 
attached to the quiet and refuse to continue to support guerillas fighters.  
  
Aiming low 
A time-tested negotiating strategy recommends that we aim higher – ask for more 
than we might actually settle for: price your home high when you put it on the market, 
demand a steeper raise than you would be satisfied with, push your children to get 
                                                        
18 President Anwar Sadat’s speech to the Israeli Knesset, November 20th, 1977. 
English version available online: http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/Peace/sadat_speech.html 
19 President Bill Clinton on Northern Ireland’s Good Friday Agreement, December 13th, 2000. Available 
online: 
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/clinton-urges-peace-in-farewell-ulster-speech-
626328.html 
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straight A’s so that they will bring home B+’s and so on. The strategy has a diplomatic 
correlate: articulating ambitious goals as part of a process of conflict resolution in hope 
that the parties will be pressured into making more progress. Aim at reconciliation and 
you end up with coexistence. Aim at coexistence and you end up with the status quo.  
High expectations can, indeed, motivate a negotiating partner. But they can also 
paralyze her. They can signal that she is bound to disappoint and, as a result, instill a 
sense of helplessness. The risk is not limited to a specific party bowing out of the 
negotiation. Setting goals too high may well create a sense of cynicism about the activity 
itself. Buyers may stay away from our home altogether; our children may simply give up 
on their studies. The combatants may decide that “if this is what peace is about – if this is 
what we have to do for it – we have no interest.”   
Truce Thinking works in the reverse direction. It aims low in order to strike high. 
It seeks to generate a measurable, visible reduction of war. To give combatants a “taste” 
of peace, hoping that the taste will create an appetite, hoping, to use the words of the 
Palestinian poet Mahmoud Darwish, that “the flavor of peace may be absorbed by the 
soul.”20  
The Freeze movement ignited by Randall Forsberg in the 1980’s illustrates the 
potential of aiming low. A two paragraph proposal to first “decide when and how to 
achieve a mutual and verifiable freeze on the testing, production and future development 
of nuclear warheads” and later to “to pursue…verifiable reductions” in the number of 
such warheads, caught on like a brush fire in the United States, sweeping up scores of 
civic and professional organizations, city councils and state legislators. Within two years                                                         
20 Taken from the poem “State of Siege”. Published in Darwish, M. 2011. Akash, M. Trans. State of Siege. 
Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press.  
 17 
of its publication, the Freeze proposal became the most “successful American grassroots 
movement of the twentieth century.”21 It brought out millions into the streets, was 
adopted by the House of Representatives and, eventually, convinced President Reagan 
that his policy of preparing for, rather than trying to avoid a nuclear war with the 
Russians had to be reversed. Part of the reason why the Freeze movement was so 
effective lay in its modesty. The proposal was a quintessential example of Truce 
Thinking –it stated an obtainable, tangible goal, which ordinary people who knew little 
about international security could relate to. Rather than “banning the bomb” or ending the 
state of war with the Russians, Forsberg and her followers called for freezing nuclear 
weapons at their current levels. They demanded a truce in the nuclear arms race rather 
than pushing for ending it all together. The effect, however, was to begin the process of 
arms reduction. 
Albert Camus’ 1956 call for a “civilian truce22” between the French and the Front 
de Libération Nationale (FLN) forces fighting in Algeria was based on a similar premise. 
The French and Algerians could agree on very little, he knew, but he hoped that they 
could at least agree to refrain from attacking civilians. “It is possible today,” he wrote, 
“on a single definite point, to agree first and then to save human lives.” Such limited 
agreement may open the door for future progress: “by bringing about such a slight thaw 
on a single point, we may hope someday to break altogether the block of hatreds and 
crazy demands in which we are all caught.” Unlike the “Freeze” initiative, Camus’ 
                                                        
21 For a useful overview of the Freeze movement see Carroll, J. 2006. House of War: The Pentagon and the 
Disastrous Rise of American Power. Boston, New York: Houghton Mifflin pp. 385-397. 
22 Camus’ appeal is available on line here: http://www.pwf.cz/archivy/texts/readings/albert-camus-appeal-for-a-civilian-truce-in-algeria_2881.html 
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“Civilian Truce” proposal failed miserably. Given the asymmetrical nature of the conflict 
in Algeria, his specific version of “thawing” was ill chosen. The FLN was under-funded 
and under-equipped and had little choice but to resort to guerilla tactics that, inevitably, 
involved harm to civilians.  Accepting Camus’ proposal would have, practically speaking, 
meant giving up their struggle all together. And yet, the idea of “thawing”, as Camus laid 
it out, was crucial. When a comprehensive agreement is out of reach, parties can be well 
served by locating a modest, narrow area of agreement and attempting to make progress 
on that limited front. Such an agreement serves to improve their situation in that context, 
to create a channel of communication that may be used for further acts of “thawing” and, 
in addition, demonstrates to the parties involved that they are capable of constructive 
interaction.  
The legal scholar Gabriella Blum has made a similar claim in her recent book 
Islands of Agreement. Blum argues that practitioners and scholars concerned with 
international conflict focus on questions of conflict resolution and tend to ignore 
opportunities for limited but significant localized cooperation: “most conflictual 
situations, even those of armed conflict, may be found to include some areas that both 
parties have in common and that can serve as a basis for cooperation, however limited.”23 
Such agreements “carve out pieces of the conflict and attempt to sustain an equilibrium of 
more limited hostile engagement, thereby mitigating destruction and preventing further 
escalation.” Blum’s examples range from a 19th century arrangement between the United 
States and Mexico to protect merchants in case a war should break out between the two 
nations, to agreements between China and Japan to protect certain kinds of naval vessels                                                         
23  Blum, G.2007. Island of Agreement: Managing Enduring Armed Rivalries. Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press. P. 4 
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during any potential conflict, to the Indus Waters Treaty between India and Pakistan 
discussed earlier.  
 
Irreconcilable enemies don’t have to fight  
It is possible to avert war with those who will not make peace with us. Israel and 
the Hamas are genuinely irreconcilable. The Soviets and the Americans were genuinely 
irreconcilable during much of the Cold War. But the realization that others are radically, 
wildly different from us, that they see the world in terms that we can never accept, that 
they are, in principle, committed to our demise, does not have to lead to belligerence.  
In early 1946, the American Diplomat George Kennan sat down at his desk in 
Moscow to write a reply to a query sent by the State Department. His superiors wanted to 
know why the Soviets refused to join the World Bank and the International Monetary 
Fund. Kennan’s response, which became known as the “Long Telegram,” (it was 8000 
words long and opened with an apology for “burdening the telegraphic channel”) went 
far beyond the question. It took up the future of the relationship between the two powers 
in the broadest terms.24 Kennan argued that the radical difference between American and 
Soviet ideologies did not imply that military confrontation was inevitable. First, because 
Soviet ideology itself did not dictate war: “we are going to continue for long time to find 
the Russians difficult to deal with. It does not mean that they should be considered as 
embarked upon a do-or-die program to overthrow our society by a given date. The theory 
of the inevitability of the eventual fall of capitalism has the fortunate connotation that 
                                                        
24 The Telegram was later revised and published anonymously in the July 1947 issue of  Foreign Affairs 
under the title “The Sources of Soviet Conduct”. It became known as the X Article. I quote from the 
Foreign Affairs version of the essay.  
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there is no hurry about it. The forces of progress can take their time in preparing the final 
coup de grâce.” Second, because ideological difference alone neither starts nor sustains a 
war: “[World War II] has added its tremendous toll of destruction, death and human 
exhaustion. In consequence of this, we have in Russia today a population which is 
physically and spiritually tired… There are limits to the physical and nervous strength of 
people themselves.” 
Kennan reminds us that those who are, in theory, ready for a “duel of infinite 
duration” do not have to become enemies in practice. An opposing political entity can 
stand on the other side of an ideological abyss and yet harbor no tangible desire to fight. 
The ideology itself, simple exhaustion or a combination of both may well bode for quiet.  
There is a gap, Kennan suggests, between ideological difference and military 
action. And we can exploit that gap; we can buy time, perhaps even a lot of time. And 
during that time, if we become the best, most principled example of ourselves, if we show 
off the ways in which our own ideological and cultural commitments are more benign 
than those of the competition, things may change in our favor. For Kennan, 
“containment,” the term he became famous for, was mainly a cultural, diplomatic project. 
Prevailing in the contest with the Russians depended largely on whether the US could 
“measure up to its own best traditions and prove itself worthy of preservation as a great 
nation.” 
Tragically, Secretary of Defense Forrestal, who initially encouraged Kennan to 
rewrite his telegram as an essay for Foreign Affairs, badly misread his protégé’s 
argument. Focusing exclusively on the discussion of the unbridgeable ideological 
difference between the Soviets and Americans, he concluded that the Soviets were, by 
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definition, an enemy and had to be met with equal force anywhere they made military 
headway. It was this militarized understanding of containment that, to a large extent, 
animated the American involvements in Korea and Vietnam. 
Forestal’s distortion notwithstanding, Kennan’s essay embodies an important 
facet of Truce Thinking. Long term quiet and real enmity are compatible. Though it 
would certainly be nice, we do not have to stop hating, fearing or disagreeing with others 
in order to prevent war. The very ideologies we balk at can become the source of calm. 
Marxism did not require a War of Armageddon with the West. Neither does Political 
Islam. There are openings. There are cracks. The question for the Truce Thinker is not 
whether we can make friends out of our enemies. It is, rather, whether we can get to 
know our enemies well enough, as Kennan did, to find ways of not fighting them. 
 
Steering clear of “Imprudent Vehemence”  
In an essay titled “Of The Balance of Powers,” David Hume indicts Britain for a 
degree of “imprudent vehemence” in fighting her wars with France. An excessive 
commitment to the justness of her cause, to her alliances and to the very idea of spirited 
fighting led Britain to fight longer and harder than she had to, without achieving 
substantive gains from the prolonged engagements.25 War, Hume seems to suggest, while 
sometimes necessary, should proceed in the most economic fashion possible, and in the 
name of a country’s most vital interests. Fighting to vindicate political principles or an 
interpretation of political identity, while honorable, ends up bringing about unnecessary 
harm. Picking up on Hume’s idea of “imprudent vehemence,” the political theorist                                                         
25 Hume, D. 1987. “Of the Balance of Powers” in David Hume Essays Moral Political and Literary, Miller, 
E.F. ed. Indianapolis, IN: Liberty Fund. Pp332-341 
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Michael Doyle has suggested that such an over-zealous attachment to liberal principles 
may at least partially explain the fact that, contrary to Kant’s predictions, democracies are 
not especially peaceful when it comes to their dealings with non-democracies:  “in 
relations with powerful non-liberal states, liberal states have missed opportunities to 
pursue negotiation of arms reduction and arms control when it has been in the mutual 
strategic interest.” Thus, for example, “Opportunities for splitting the communist bloc 
along cleavages of strategic national interest were delayed.” The Americans failed, for a 
long time, “to exploit and appreciate …the Sino Soviet split,” largely because they 
thought that a liberal regime should not befriend the totalitarian Chinese. Similar delays 
resulted in a failure to support Tito’s independent minded version of communism in 
Yugoslavia.26 The Truce Thinker is sympathetic to Hume on this point. Prioritizing 
principles or a virtuous national self-understanding may make wars longer and bloodier 
than they have to be. The sentiment is summed up by the historian A. J. P. Taylor who 
famously commented that “Bismark fought ‘necessary’ wars and killed thousands; the 
idealists of the twentieth century fought ‘just’ wars and killed millions.”27  
The Truce Thinker would engage the Soviet Union in arms reduction talks over 
the objections of a Solzhenitsyn who claimed that the Russians’ abysmal record on 
human rights disqualifies them as negotiating partners. He would engage North Korea in 
an effort to control its nuclear program, in spite of that nation’s appalling treatment of its 
own citizens.  The argument, in both cases, is that the potential benefit of arms control is 
simply too great to abandon in the name of liberal principles, and that standing on 
                                                        
26 Doyle, M.W. 2006. “Kant and Liberal Internationalism” in Kleingeld, P. Toward Perpetual Peace and 
Other Writings on Politics, Peace, and History. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. pp 218-219 
27 Taylor, A.J.P. 1953. Rumours of Wars. Hamish Hamilton. P 44 
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principle in such cases amounts to a form of “imprudent vehemence.”28 
Preparations for Future Fighting 
Finally, some truce makers hope that by pausing or reducing the rigors of war, 
they will improve their position in future fighting; combatants may rest, work on 
fortifications, improve the quality of armaments, replenish ammunition, repair equipment 
and so on. It is, of course, this kind of motivation that is at the root of Kant’s suspicion of 
truces. The Tamil Tigers, for example, signed up to a 2002 truce with the Sri Lankan 
army only in order to buy time and rearm. A certain Colonel Caruna who broke with the 
Tigers told London’s Guardian that the guerrillas' leader, Velupillai Prabhakaran, 
instructed him to “drag these talks out for about five years. Somehow let the time pass by.” 
In the meantime, the leader added, “I will purchase arms and we will be ready for the 
next stage of fighting.”29 Many Britons were suspicious when the Provisional IRA 
offered a Christmas Truce in December of 1972. “What is this magnanimous truce they 
have ordered?” asked the Glasgow Times in a December 21st editorial. “Is it an 
opportunity to regroup and rearm? Is it an opportunity to lull the British people into a 
false sense of security?”30 Israel is concerned that Hezbollah has been using a United 
Nations brokered 2006 ceasefire to rearm and improve its weapons systems for a future 
                                                        
28 For a position of this kind on North Korea see Walter Clemens’ Op-Ed piece of November 4th, 2011 in 
the New York Times titled “Listening to the Axis of Evil”. Clemens writes:  
 “If a cruel dictatorship is willing to negotiate security arrangements that make war less likely, democratic 
governments should engage with them and seek a deal…. The world has always had its bad guys. 
Negotiating with them can be distasteful but useful — as the many arms control accords signed by the 
United States and the Soviet Union attest.” Available online at: 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/04/opinion/listening-to-the-axis-of-evil.html 
29 Guardian, April 4th, 2007. Available at: http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2007/apr/04/srilanka 
30 Glasgow Herald, December 21st, 1974. Available at:  
http://news.google.com/newspapers?id=5Y9AAAAAIBAJ&sjid=7KQMAAAAIBAJ&pg=1765,4318698&
dq=truce+rearm&hl=en 
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round of fighting. A Hezbollah commander admitted as much in an interview with the 
Observer: “Sure, we are rearming, we have even said that we have far more rockets and 
missiles than we did in 2006.”31 
Let us take stock of how we have characterized Truce Thinking. Contrary to the 
Kantian assertion that war must be seen as an anomaly to be eradicated, the Truce 
Thinker recognizes that there are cases in which it must be understood as a chronic 
condition to be managed. This is especially true in asymmetrical conflicts but not only in 
these; the list of intractable symmetrical conflicts is considerable as well (India and 
Pakistan, North and South Korea, Israel and Syria to name a few). In such cases, it is 
useful to turn away from the ideal of conflict resolution - informed, indeed inaugurated 
by the Kantian rejection of war itself - and focus on minimizing the costs of fighting 
instead. The optimism about the passage of time expressed in Druyanov’s anecdote, the 
focus on thawing evident in Camus’s proposal, the realization that ideological enmity 
does not have to result in actual fighting and Hume’s skepticism about fighting in the 
name of transcendent rather than tangible interests, all converge into a focus on managing, 
containing, partially avoiding and postponing conflict rather than completely eradicating 
it. All these tendencies express an acceptance of war’s reality and even its occasional 
necessity, on the one hand, and an insistence that its costs can be controlled on the other. 
Truce Thinking, then, amounts to a non-transcendental theory of conflict reduction. 
Western political thought about war’s end has neglected, marginalized or completely 
rejected this way of thinking. In fact, as we have seen, it has collapsed Truce Thinking 
into the most crass form of political realism and has proceeded to repudiate it on those                                                         
31 Guardian, November 8th, 2009. Available at: http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/nov/08/hezbollah-
rearms-against-israel 
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grounds.  
The thrust of Truce Thinking as presented here is pragmatic. It is not meant to 
“unseat” Kant’s ideal but to add to our repertoire for thinking about winding down wars. 
As we have noted in the first chapter, the legacy of Kant’s theory of peace is immense: 
the United Nations, the permanent International Criminal Court, the Ad Hoc International 
Criminal Tribunals from Nuremberg to Yugoslavia, the gradual spread, after the Second 
World War, of the culture of universal human rights, our tradition (spotty as it is) of 
humanitarian intervention and genocide prevention, the European Union - to name but a 
few developments - can be traced directly to Kant’s cosmopolitan ideal. The trouble is 
not with the cosmopolitan ideal of perpetual peace but with the insistence on applying it 
rigidly to all conflicts. As I have argued in the previous chapter and reiterated here, the 
ideal offers problematic guidance in a specific set of cases. If, for example, the Scholar 
Martin van Creveld is right to argue that international conflict has moved into the nooks 
and crannies of the international system, and is now largely a matter of states fighting 
diffuse, non- state organizations, it is not clear that the idea of perpetual peace, premised 
as it is on the ability of nation states to exert centralized control over the use of violence, 
remains a promising way of thinking about winding down conflicts. Indeed, as I have 
argued here and will explore in greater detail in part III, Kant’s ideal has, occasionally, 
led policy makers to insist on dangerous, ineffective ideas for ending war while rejecting 
useful proposals for reducing its harms. 
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5. Truce Thinking and Realpolitik 
 Recall Kant’s charge that truces are exercises in political cynicism. As far as Kant 
is concerned, the Truce Thinker practices a Machiavellian separation between ethics and 
statecraft – a form of realpolitik that scholars of international relations sometimes call 
“radical” or “extreme” realism.”32 For the radical realist the unsentimental, unapologetic 
pursuit of political self-interest is the only way to ensure a state’s survival. “Because 
there is such a distance between how one lives and how one should live,” Machiavelli 
writes in the infamous central chapter of the Prince, “he who lets go that which is done 
for that which ought to be done learns his ruin rather than his preservation…33”  The 
same disdain for normative considerations is displayed by the Athenians in Thucydides’ 
Melian Dialogue. Thucydides imagines a conversation between the envoys of Athens and 
the representatives of the tiny Island state of Melos, which the Athenians were about to 
conquer. The Melians insist that they have done nothing wrong and should, by rights, be 
left alone. The Athenian generals scoff at this. Justice, they remind the Melians, comes 
into play only between equals. But “when one side is stronger, it gets as much as it can, 
and the weak must accept that.”34  
 We should now be in a position to at least partially reject Kant’s accusation. Truce 
Thinking does not segregate ethics and international relations. It is, in fact, committed to 
a straight forward moral principle: economizing on the costs of war. Of the five 
dispositions definitive of Truce Thinking (optimism about the passage of time, aiming                                                         
32 For a useful overview of the different varieties of realism see: 
Korab-Karpowicz, W. J. 2011. "Political Realism in International Relations", The Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy. Zalta, E.N. (ed.), URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2011/entries/realism-intl-
relations/>. 
33 Machiavelli, N. 1989. The Prince. de Alvarez trans. Waveland Press. p. 93 
34 Thucydides. 1972. History of the Peloponnesian War, trans. Rex Warner, Harmondsworth: Penguin 
Books, 1972. 5.89 
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low, ideological enemies don’t have to fight, de-emphasizing principles, preparing for 
future conflict) the first three include explicitly moral commitments: putting off violence 
in hope that a period of quiet will usher in further quiet; finding discrete “islands of 
agreement” so as to limit belligerence, alleviate suffering and restore trust among 
combatants; finding “gaps” between official ideologies and actual material and political 
conditions, as Kennan suggested, so that theoretical enmity is not translated into actual 
warfare. Underlying these three aspects of truce thinking, then, is the normative 
dedication - not to eradicate war, not to end it once and for all, but to put it off for as long 
as possible and to limit and manage its costs when it can’t be put off.  
 The fourth aspect of Truce Thinking– the Humean recommendation that wars not 
be fought for transcendent ideals but for precisely defined national interests, certainly has 
a realist orientation. While Hume insists that such a focus economizes on the harm war 
does, his recommendation is not quite sufficient to protect against a slide to radical 
realism. His line of thought may well justify aggressive warfare in the name of an 
especially pernicious understanding of one’s self interest. Here it is perhaps useful to 
elaborate on the relationship between the different aspects of Truce Thinking. I take the 
de-emphasis of principle suggested by Hume to be subordinate to the first three aspects of 
Truce Thinking. In other words, the Truce Thinker de-emphasizes principle when such an 
orientation can be helpful in buying a significant amount of time, locating islands of 
agreement, or finding gaps between opposed ideologies and actual material conditions. 
To simply deemphasize principle in one’s conduct of foreign policy does leave one open 
to the charge of realpolitik (more precisely such conduct constitutes the definition of 
realpolitik). Thus, for example, Israel has a legitimate expectation, grounded in 
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cosmopolitan principles, that a peace agreement with the Palestinians include a clause of 
mutual recognition. The Truce Thinker would de-emphasize this expectation only if there 
were reasons to suppose that it is getting in the way of striking an otherwise beneficial 
deal. If the choice is between failing to reach a completely just and legitimate peace, and 
reaching a partially satisfying, reasonably stable interim agreement that actually promotes 
calm on the ground, the Truce Thinker chooses the latter.  
 In conclusion, any act of Truce Thinking that emphasizes the first three 
commitments and subordinates the fourth to them cannot be justifiably accused of 
realpolitik. An act of Truce Thinking that emphasizes the fifth aspect (making truces 
simply to improve one’s position in future fighting) is susceptible to Kant’s charge. It is 
worth qualifying even this last statement. The reasons for reaching a political 
arrangement do not always exhaust its ultimate significance. The Magna Carta was 
conceived as a purely political compromise between King John and his barons. The South 
African Truth and Reconciliation Commission was a political compromise resulting from 
the stalemate between the National Party and the African National Congress. And yet 
both institutions came to take on moral meaning apart from the reasons they were created, 
as symbols of constitutionalism and political reconciliation respectively.35 A truce can 
change political circumstances in ways quite different from those intended by its 
instigators; even if initiated as an opportunity to rest and rearm, it can come to mean 
different things to the people whose life it impacts than it does to those who set it in 
                                                        
35 Reflecting on the moral tradeoffs involved in the work of South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission, the political theorist Jonathan Allen writes: “the fact that an institution is the product of a 
political negotiation in which the parties were intent on self-interested goals, narrowly conceived, does not 
demonstrate that the institution does not also and in spite of the participants’ goals, express morally 
defensible values.” Allen, J. 1999. “Balancing Justice and Social Unity: Political Theory and the Idea of a 
Truth and Reconciliation Commission,” University of Toronto Law Journal, v. XLIX (3) p. 322. 
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motion. As Burke reminds us, for better and worse, there is rarely linear causation in 
politics: “that which in the first instance is prejudicial may be excellent in its remoter 
operation.” But Burke’s point only takes us so far. To suggest that the most cynical 
reasons for making truces can be morally justified due to unforeseen future consequences 
requires a greater consequentialist commitment than I am willing to make. So let us 
suffice in presenting this last point as a cautionary note: pure realpoitik is subject to 
moral condemnation; making truces simply in order to rearm is subject to moral 
condemnation. And yet the Truce Thinker displays a degree of epistemological modesty. 
Bad indentions do not necessarily result in bad political conditions. 
 It is, of course, a separate question altogether whether Truce Thinking is related to 
more moderate understandings of political realism. The so-called “classical realists,” for 
example, are not as adamant about separating ethics and international politics as their 
radical counterparts. In his 1948 Politics Among Nations, Hans Morgenthau argued that, 
when applied to international relations, moral principles should be tempered by a sense of 
prudence: “Universal moral principles…cannot be applied to the actions of states in their 
abstract universal formulation, but …they must be filtered through the concrete 
circumstances of time and place…there can be no political morality without prudence; 
that is, without consideration of the political consequences of seemingly moral action… 
A man who was nothing but ‘political man’ would be a beast, for he would be completely 
lacking in moral restraints. A man who was nothing but ‘moral man’ would be a fool, for 
he would be completely lacking in prudence.”36 Whether or not Truce Thinking is 
consistent with classical realism àla Morgenthau can be left undecided for the moment. It                                                         
36 Morgenthau, H. 1948. Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace. New York, NY: 
McGraw Hill. p. 12 
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is not Morgenthau’s view of international politics that Kant attacks, but, rather, 
Machiavelli’s insistence that the purely “political man” is not a “beast” but rather the 
only true prince. Kant is right to reject the Machiavellian view of winding down wars. So 
far, I hope to have established that Truce Thinking, as it is described here, cannot be 
reduced to it. 
 
6. Truce Thinking and the weaknesses of Perpetual Peace 
Truce thinking is not susceptible to the critiques of cosmopolitan peace 
enumerated earlier. As we have seen, its first three facets (optimism about the passage of 
time, aiming low and the realization that ideological rivals need not fight) stress conflict 
management rather than resolution. Consequently the theory is especially helpful for 
thinking about asymmetrical warfare, counter insurgency campaigns and other forms of 
war that are difficult to comprehensively end. 
For similar reasons, Truce Thinking is helpful in seizing opportunities for limited, 
localized agreements (opportunities that the cosmopolitan approach, with its dismissal of 
partial arrangements, is likely to let pass). The Truce Thinker, to use the language we 
have borrowed from Camus, sees such localized agreements as possibilities for “thawing”, 
opportunities that carry a triple benefit: a chance to alleviate specific suffering while, at 
the same time, creating channels for future communication and demonstrating to the 
combatants (and to third parties) that constructive interaction is still possible in spite of 
the violence.   
By de-emphasizing questions of political identity and other transcendent 
considerations for going to war, the Truce Thinker is more resistant to the risk, articulated 
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by Kenneth Waltz, of engaging in a “democratic crusade” in order to make the world 
more peaceful. She is also more willing to engage non-democrats and even anti-
democrats if the stakes are sufficiently high. While this may raise concerns about 
appeasement (an objection we shall address in the last part of the book), it also implies 
that the Truce Thinker will neither fight primarily in the name of an idea nor refuse to 
negotiate simply because her interlocutor does not share her conception of the good.  
 
7. Positive arguments in support of Truce Thinking 
Truces in Political Islam 
From Palestine to Afghanistan to Iraq western powers have spent a good deal of 
the last two decades fighting (primarily asymmetrical engagements) with Muslims. An 
important advantage of introducing truces into our political repertoire is that Islamic 
Jurisprudence devotes a good deal of attention to them. The first truce in the Islamic 
tradition can be traced back to the Treaty of Hudaybiyah signed in 628 AD between 
Mohammad and the people of the tribe of Quraysh who controlled the city of Mecca. 
Mohammad and his followers wanted to perform a pilgrimage to Mecca but the local 
inhabitants did not welcome them. In order to avert a bloody confrontation, the parties 
reached a 10-year ceasefire regulating future pilgrimages. This agreement is the source of 
legitimacy of truces in Islam.37 
An Islamic truce or “hudna” consists in the suspension of the duty of Jihad against 
non-believers. It is permissible for Muslims to enter into such an agreement under a 
                                                        
37 As one scholar puts it: “the treaty signed by the Prophet with the Meccans at Hudaybiyah … was adopted 
as a model to be followed in respect to its stipulations, implementation and for the reason of its eventual 
revocation” See Weigert, G. 1997. “A Note on Hudna: Peace Making in Islam” in War and Society in the 
Eastern Mediterranean, 7th-15th centuries. Leiden, The Netherlands: Brill Publishers. pp. 400-401.  
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variety of circumstances – ranging from the perceived military weakness of the Muslim 
army through the remoteness of the battlefield to the scarcity of resources necessary for 
fighting.38  
Muslim thinkers allow for a wide range of hudnas – some lasting only a few days, 
intended primarily for rest and rearmament, others enduring six or, as in the case of 
Hudaybiyah, ten years. Furthermore, most Suni scholars accept the idea of unlimited 
hudnas when it is clear that the Muslim army cannot defeat its enemy.39  
The historical record provides numerous examples of truces between Muslims and 
“infidels.” Saladin and the Crusaders signed eight such agreements in the twelfth century 
(4 initiated by the Crusaders, 4 prompted by Saladin). Only one of these was broken.40 
The French and their Algerian foes under the command of Abd Al-Qadir signed two 
hudnas in the 1830’s,41 and the Spanish and the Moroccans signed a hudna in 1860 that 
eventually developed into a full-blown peace agreement.42 
Hudna is not the only term in Islamic jurisprudence denoting a temporary 
cessation of hostilities. The related notion of tahadiya shares the identical Arabic root  
h-d-n, denoting quiet or calm. While a tahadiya is usually a short, informal, often 
unilateral ceasefire, hudnas are formal, binding agreements between two parties and it is 
rare for them to be broken, as their stability and endurance are tied with the honor of the 
signatories: “Hudna,” writes one scholar, “denotes something sacred, although it is not a 
religious notion per se. Once a person has signed or shaken hands on a Hudna agreement                                                         
38 Ibid, p. 400 
39 Ibid, p. 402 
40 See Ginat, J. 2006. "Hudna: Origins of the Concept and its relevance to the Arab-Israeli Conflict" in 
Podeh, E. and Kaufman, A.(eds.) Arab-Jewish Relations: From Conflict to Resolution. East Sussex, UK: 
Sussex Academic Press. P. 255  
41 Ibid, p. 257 
42 Ibid, p. 258 
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for a certain period of time, he might not renew it, but he will not resume fighting before 
the term of the agreement is over. There is a belief among Muslims that whoever 
breaches a Hudna will be punished by the almighty: one of the breaching party’s family 
members may die or contract an incurable illness. If one breaches a cease-fire that is not a 
Hudna, there will be no retribution from Heaven. The annulment of other terms or 
agreements, even of a peace treaty, is not as severe as the annulment of a Hudna.”43  
Muslims take hudnas seriously. They view such agreements as a way of curtailing, 
sometimes even permanently ending wars. Western powers have been doing a lot of 
fighting with Muslims. Shouldn’t these powers think more carefully about a method of 
conflict reduction central to the political tradition of their enemies?  
Consider the recent history of the Israeli Palestinian conflict. Ever since the early 
1990’s moderate Israelis have been claiming that they want to reconcile with the 
Palestinians –to reach a peace accord ending all mutual claims and involving mutual 
recognition. The operative terms are Kantian– perpetual peace with justice and 
recognition. But these terms are foreign to a good deal of Islamic jurisprudence. Instead, 
Hamas, and increasingly other Palestinian factions, have claimed that they cannot 
recognize Israel as a Jewish State but would, rather, sign a long-term hudna with it. The 
Israelis, in turn, have taken such statements as evidence of Palestinian rejectionism. But 
what is it that is being rejected? Could it be that what is being rejected is the 
metaphysical baggage that comes with the idea of permanent peace and recognition rather 
than the reality in which people commit to stop killing each other?  
A famous commentary on the truce of Hudaybiyah by Az-Zuhri tells us that 
“when the truce came and war laid down its burdens and people felt safe with one another,                                                         
43 Ibid, p. 254 
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then they met and indulged in conversation and discussion.”44 There is, according to this 
account, no need for a formal and final peace agreement in order for the combatants to 
talk (even “indulge” in talking) with each other. A reliable setting down of the burdens of 
war can suffice. The emphasis is not placed on the rationality of peace, nor on the rights 
of former combatants and their need to have their political identity reaffirmed, but on 
what happens when we focus on the more modest goal of easing – not completely and not 
forever – the rigors of battle. 
 
Truces track practice  
War does not always end with a clear-cut victory followed by a stable peace. Our 
stock associations – a signing ceremony on the Louisiana, confetti raining down on the 
crowds in Times Square, Churchill addressing ecstatic crowds outside Buckingham 
Palace, increasingly represent the exception rather than the rule of how wars actually 
wind down. This is especially true if we adhere to the Clausewitzian definition of war as 
an instrument of policy (and of victory in war as the ability to impose our policy aims on 
our enemies). On such an understanding, the American Civil War did not end with the 
victory of the North because, within a decade, the South was able to frustrate the northern 
vision of extending political rights to blacks. The first Gulf War didn’t end with an 
American victory because, in spite of America’s desire for a swift and clearly determined 
confrontation, the conflict ended with Saddam Hussein still in power, slaughtering the 
same insurgents the Americans had encouraged to rise up against him.   
                                                        
44 See: Pickthall, M. 2004.The glorious Qur'an: Text and Explanatory Translation. Elmhurst, NY: Tahrike 
Tarsile. Surah 48, p. 557 
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These “ragged endings”45 have become more noticeable after World War II. As 
we have seen earlier, since the late forties most military confrontations have become 
asymmetrical. Such conflicts are not usually “won”. They are, rather, kept at bay, 
stabilized or managed until they are brought to a bearable level or until slacking domestic 
support and prohibitive costs force the stronger power to call it quits. The French retreat 
from Algeria, the Israeli retreat from Southern Lebanon and the recent American 
departure from Iraq all follow this pattern. In fact, the way such conflicts play out 
suggests that our traditional ways of talking and thinking about armed conflict –the 
distinctions we make between war and peace, victory and defeat have become unstable. 
Did the Iraqi war end in December of 2011 just because the Americans left? Did the 
Americans win that war? Is Iraq now at peace? Who won the 2006 conflagration between 
Israel and the Hezbollah? And who is winning in Afghanistan?  
Winning and the institution of peace have traditionally meant that one side can 
impose its political purposes on another. But guerilla warfare upsets this Clausewitzian 
view of war, often rendering it irrelevant.  A party that has been defeated in conventional 
warfare can switch to guerilla tactics (as did the Taliban, the Iraqis and, according to 
some historians, the Southern Democrats after the American Civil War) in order to make 
sure the stronger side cannot obtain their political goals militarily.46 When this happens, 
the very aims of war often change to stabilization, the reduction of killing and the 
establishment of some public order. None of these achievements presuppose a permanent, 
just end to conflict and all of them are closer to our definition of truce than they are to the 
classical idea of peace.                                                            
45 I borrow the term from Jeb Sharp’s excellent five part series for PRI titled “How Wars End”. Audio 
available here: http://www.pri.org/theworld/?q=how_wars_end 
46 See Stephen Biddle, Interview with Jeb Sharp, Ibid.  
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Earlier we argued that the Kantian idea of peace is not useful for thinking about 
asymmetrical conflicts. It seems that the idea of peace suffers when it becomes difficult 
to clearly delineate victory or pinpoint war’s end.  Perhaps the very meaning of peace is 
derivative or dependent on the clarity of those terms. But we are not, here, trying to refine 
Kant’s definition of peace and we need not answer these questions. Our purpose, in this 
section, is to provide positive arguments for taking the idea of truce seriously. And a look 
at how wars actually do end, especially recently, clarifies why we should: we tend to 
think that most wars end and that they are followed by a state of affairs we call peace. 
But in fact, many contemporary wars don’t end at all. They morph - like the war in Iraq 
(from a brief exchange in 1991, to more than a decade of sanctions and the imposition of 
a no fly zone, to another brief exchange in 2003, followed by several years of counter-
insurgency fighting) or Israel’s war in Lebanon (from a brief, intense confrontation with 
the PLO in all of Lebanon in 1982, to a war of attrition with the PLO and later with 
Hezbollah in Southern Lebanon in the mid 1980’s and 1990’s, to a series of cross border 
skirmishes with Hezbollah in the first years of the new century, to another brief, intense 
war against Hezbollah in 2006, back to the heightened cross-border tensions obtaining as 
of this writing). They are managed, tweaked, kept at bay. This reality suggests that the 
idea of truce, as we have defined it, holds a fair degree of descriptive power.    
 There is, then, a curious gulf between how we talk and think about war’s end and 
how we actually wind wars down. Truces are common in the practice of mitigating 
warfare but are almost never the subject of theoretical inquiry and are routinely dismissed 
as illegitimate political goals (recall the talk of “mere truces” in chapter 1). We make 
truces, some of them are quite effective in curtailing violence, but we rarely think about 
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what it means to make them, what assumptions underlie the willingness to make them, 
whether there are circumstances in which it is more appropriate to make truces than to 
insist on peace and so on. The political philosopher Michael Sandel has argued, in 
another context, that such gaps between what we do and the language available to talk 
and reflect about what we do induces moral disorientation or “vertigo.”47 What it means 
to have this gap, practically speaking, is that a potentially powerful and effective way of 
mitigating the results of war is not immediately available to our imagination – that our 
conceptual toolkit for winding down war is not as rich as it could be. The Americans and 
the Russians had a cold “war” though they didn’t fight; the Israelis and Palestinians have 
a never ending “peace process”, though anything like a cosmopolitan peace is unlikely to 
be its result; The Taliban, it is hoped, will eventually engage in a “peace process” in 
Afghanistan though, here too, it seems like the result will look nothing like a Kantian 
peace; “reconciliation” was heralded as a benchmark for leaving Iraq in 2007, though our 
essentially Kantian idea of reconciliation was both foreign to the indigenous population 
and quite far from any accommodation that eventually emerged. In all of these cases it 
would have been more helpful to describe these relationships in terms that broke free 
from the war/peace dichotomy. The main goal of this book is to provide and articulate 
such terms.  
 
                                                        
47 Writing about the way germline genetic engineering has outstripped existing moral categories Sandel 
warns: “When science moves faster than moral understanding, as it does today, men and women struggle to 
articulate their unease. In liberal societies they reach first for the language of autonomy, fairness, and 
individual rights. But this part of our moral vocabulary is ill equipped to address the hardest questions 
posed by cloning, designer children and genetic engineering. That is why the genomic revolution has 
induced a kind of moral vertigo.” See Sandel, M. 2007. The Case Against Perfection. Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press. P. 9 
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Truces can keep us safe too 
We assume that peace is required to keep us safe. That’s part of its allure. We 
speak of a “lasting” or “stable” peace supposing that once we have achieved it (even if at 
a considerable price) we could finally begin living as private men and women focusing 
on our work and families. At peace, the liberal polity finally fulfills its telos and becomes 
an enabler rather than a taker of lives.  
But a cursory glance at history suggests that peace is not always necessary to keep 
us safe. The policy of détente between the U.S. and the Soviet Union, an exercise in 
conflict management and avoidance if there ever was one, kept the two powers from 
destroying the world, until conditions ripened for a more principled and ambitious 
relationship. For more than thirty years, Israel has had a peace treaty with Egypt and an 
armistice with Syria. It is far from clear that its northern border is more dangerous than 
its southern one. There have been almost no direct confrontations over the last decades on 
both fronts.  While the Syrians have enabled Hezbollah to arm itself to the teeth, the 
Egyptians looked away while Hamas used their territory to smuggle munitions into the 
Gaza strip.  There is certainly no dramatic evidence that peace with Egypt has kept Israel 
much safer than its long-term truce with Syria.   
To look back much further, the so called “Concert of Europe” created after the 
end of the Napoleonic Wars was an attempt to enforce the agreements reached in the 
Vienna Conference – primarily the preservation of the balance of power between 
European powers, and the containment and reintegration of France. This was nothing like 
a principled Kantian peace – the parties had little concern for mutual attitudes, forms of 
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government, or international norms of conduct. And yet, the arrangement kept Europe 
quiet for almost a century.48  
Examples can be multiplied but the point should be clear: formal, ambitious peace 
agreements that purport to end conflict fairly and decisively often guarantee the security 
of the parties who sign them. But such agreements do not represent the only alternative 
for obtaining stability. In some cases the interests, capabilities and ideologies of the 
parties bode well for prolonged calm even in the absence of formal peace agreements.  
 
8. When to engage in Truce Thinking 
We have argued earlier that Truce Thinking is meant to supplement rather than 
supplant cosmopolitanism. It follows that a good theory of truces must provide guidelines 
for when to engage in truce making. Such guidelines should be both prudential and 
normative. They should, in other words, tell us about the circumstances under which 
Truce Thinking is useful and about the moral conditions under which it is legitimate. 
Truce Thinking is likely to be useful in cases where a comprehensive and just peace 
backed up by democratic institutions is difficult to achieve: these cases include, as we 
have seen, asymmetrical conflicts which are tough to end and are more often managed, 
long-term intractable conflicts where a cosmopolitan approach has failed (or there is 
clearly no point in trying it), cases where real ideological gaps make a comprehensive 
peace improbable, and, finally, cases where immediate cosmopolitan action can reignite 
conflict or diminish the chances of winding down hostilities (Spain immediately 
following Franco’s death or Mozambique immediately following the conclusion of its                                                         
48 On this see: Howard, M. 2000. The Invention of Peace. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press 
p. 43 
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civil war come to mind). Of course this amounts to arguing that Truce Thinking is 
relevant when cosmopolitanism is not, and such an argument, by itself, does not take us 
far enough. The important and more difficult question is figuring out when it is legitimate 
to pursue partial, limited agreements. When, in other words, should the difficulty in 
pursuing cosmopolitan peace prompt us to make truces instead? Without such normative 
guidance truce making is indeed exposed both to the Kantian critique that blames truce 
makers for cynically buying time in order to go back to war, and to the charge of 
appeasement – preferring a short-lived, temporary respite from war to the upholding of 
principles that serve long-term international security.   
The five facets of truce thinking we have outlined are helpful in answering this 
normative question.  Briefly, the more an act of truce is motivated by the first three 
characteristics of Truce Thinking, the more legitimate it is. In other words, if there are 
reasons to think that in a given case postponing war for a period of time might generate 
increased stakes in further quiet, if there are specific limited areas of agreement that can 
alleviate suffering while possibly enhancing trust between the parties, and if there are 
reasons to suspect that the ideological enmities between two parties do not have to 
translate into war – truce thinking is a legitimate and useful surrogate for Cosmopolitan 
peace making. On the other hand, an act of truce making will raise serious concerns if it 
is primarily intended to improve conditions for future fighting, or if it is animated 
primarily by the desire to put off war for the short term (without the expectation that such 
a postponement will be long- lasting or will generate stakes in further postponement). 
Now a critic may retort that these directives are not sufficiently instructive: how, 
she might plausibly ask, could one know such things? How could one tell whether truce 
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making is likely to generate further quiet, whether there are sufficient areas of agreement, 
whether there are real gaps between state ideology and material conditions on the 
ground? To rephrase this challenge in concrete historical terms, how are we, without the 
benefit of hindsight, to tell the difference between a Chamberlain who, insisting on 
“peace in our time,” sold Czechoslovakia down the river, appeased Hitler and 
precipitated the beginning of World War II and a Kennan who, in the Long Telegram, 
insisted that we should avoid war with the Soviets in spite of ideological differences, and 
by promulgating this doctrine of ‘containment’ helped, decisively, to prevent a nuclear 
holocaust?   
The question is legitimate and, with Aristotle, we must concede that there is no 
political philosophy that can comprehensively and precisely answer it. The expectation of 
mathematical precision in politics is as implausible, the old master reminds us, as are 
approximations in the natural sciences. We must then “be satisfied to indicate the truth 
roughly and in outline.”49 The key for predicting when aspects 1-3 of Truce Thinking are 
likely to be relevant –for understanding when postponing violence could lead to further 
postponements rather than an emboldening of the enemy, when there are sufficient 
“islands of agreement” to merit limited arrangements, when there are enough disparities 
between ideology and conditions on the ground to safely avoid war - lies in familiarity 
with the particulars of a given situation. Intimate, detailed, historical and cultural 
knowledge of our adversaries is the key to making these kinds of judgments. Such 
knowledge was central to Kennan’s successful recommendation. Having spent many 
years in Russia, having learnt the language, the literature, the culture, the structure of 
local politics, having talked to countless ordinary Russians, Kennan was in a position to                                                         
49 Aristotle. 1998. Nichomachean Ethics B1.3. New York, NY: Oxford University Press 
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know what he needed to know. The widespread exhaustion from World War II, so 
compellingly reported in the “Long Telegram”, was witnessed first hand. The familiarity 
with the ideological assumption that capitalism would collapse under its own weight (and 
thus need not be fought immediately) was gleamed from close and repeated reading of 
Marx and Lenin. Chamberlain, on the other hand, was primarily attuned to public opinion 
in Britain when he acquiesced in Hitler’s demands. So sparse was his knowledge of the 
German attachment to the Sudetenland that he regularly spoke of “returning” the region 
to the Germans who had never owned it in the first place. The difference, then, to put it 
starkly, between a Kennan and a Chamberlain is the difference between basing one’s 
decisions on the best available intelligence and basing them on wishful thinking. Truce 
Thinking based on the former is not, of course, guaranteed to work. There are no 
guarantees for efficacy in politics. But Truce Thinking based on the latter is both 
ineffective and illegitimate.  
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
